Airlink Update

Airlink is quietly becoming a bigger airline

From 31 August, Airlink will place its 4Z code on Qatar Airways flights between South Africa and Doha, making Doha its first long-haul destination. The arrangement initially covers Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, with further Qatar Airways destinations expected to follow. (Fly Air Link)

I think this is more significant than it looks.

Airlink has built its business around being a regional airline, feeding markets that the large international carriers cannot efficiently serve themselves.

Now it is effectively extending that network into the long-haul market without having to operate long-haul aircraft.

That is smart.

The Qatar relationship already includes Qatar's 25% investment in Airlink and the existing codeshare on Airlink's domestic and regional network. (Fly Air Link)

This is therefore not simply another codeshare, it is a logical development of the partnership.

Airlink can offer its customers access to Doha and Qatar's global network, while Qatar gets deeper access to Airlink's South African and regional network.

That is how a smaller airline can compete with much larger carriers: not by trying to become one, but by becoming more useful to them.

There is another interesting development. Airlink will also launch three weekly Lanseria–Harare flights from 15 November, its first scheduled service from Lanseria. (timeout.com)

Taken together, these moves suggest that Airlink is continuing to build its position as the regional network specialist, rather than simply expanding for the sake of expansion.

And that, in my view, is exactly the right strategy.

 

FlySafair, Harith and CemAir: What Is the Real Issue?

The proposed Harith acquisition of FlySafair has generated the predictable debate about competition, market dominance and ownership.

I think we are looking at the wrong question.

The issue isn't whether Harith should own FlySafair.

The issue is whether South Africa can allow an airline to grow while ensuring that the infrastructure around it remains genuinely competitive.

That is a much more important question.

FlySafair has become successful because it has done something relatively simple very well: operate a low-cost airline efficiently. It has built scale, maintained a strong operational reputation and developed a proposition that works in the South African market.

We should not penalise an airline for achieving that.

In fact, South Africa needs more successful airlines.

The problem arises because Harith is not simply an investor in an airline. It also has an interest in Lanseria Airport. That creates a potential conflict.

An airline competes with other airlines.

An airport provides infrastructure to those airlines.

If the same investment interests are present on both sides, competitors are entitled to ask whether access to the airport will remain neutral.

CemAir has raised precisely that concern.

The better answer is to make the rules around the infrastructure very clear.

Competitors using Lanseria should receive equal treatment.

Airport charges should be transparent.

Access should be non-discriminatory.

Commercially sensitive information must be protected.

And there must be proper oversight when those rules are breached.

If those conditions can be enforced, I don't see why South Africa should prevent investment simply because the investor already has interests elsewhere in the aviation sector.

The bigger issue is scale

There is another point that tends to get lost in these arguments.

South Africa does not have a huge domestic airline market.

We cannot simply assume that more airlines automatically means more competition.

Airlines need scale.

They need aircraft utilisation, network density, purchasing power and efficient operations.

A market containing several financially weak airlines is not necessarily more competitive than one containing fewer financially strong airlines.

We have seen enough airline failures in South Africa to understand this.

The objective should therefore not be to prevent FlySafair from becoming successful.

Nor should it be to allow FlySafair to dominate without constraint.

The objective should be sustainable competition.

That means allowing efficient airlines to grow while ensuring that competitors have a genuine opportunity to compete.

What about CemAir?

CemAir shouldn't simply be dismissed because it is a competitor.

Its concerns deserve to be tested. But there is also a strategic lesson for CemAir. It doesn't need to become another FlySafair.

CemAir's opportunity is to exploit the areas where its own operating model provides an advantage — smaller markets, different aircraft economics and regional connectivity.

And what does Harith bring?

This could ultimately be the most positive aspect of the transaction.

South African aviation needs capital.

It needs infrastructure investment.

It needs airlines that can think beyond the constraints of the domestic market.

If Harith can provide FlySafair with the capital and infrastructure platform to expand into carefully selected African markets, the opportunity could be considerably larger than simply increasing domestic capacity.

My view

I would allow the transaction, subject to strong and enforceable competition safeguards.

The issue is not whether Harith owns FlySafair.

The issue is whether ownership of an airline and interests in aviation infrastructure can coexist without disadvantaging competitors. Historically and all over Africa this is, and has been the case. Consider SAA and ACSA for example.

That is what the regulator should focus on.

South Africa needs investment.

It needs successful airlines. (If the deal stalls then FlySafair will need to seek other ownership due to the outstanding regulatory issues.)

It needs competition.

And it needs infrastructure.

We shouldn't sacrifice one to achieve another.

The objective isn't to protect airlines from competition.

It is to make sure that competition remains possible.

12 Year Engine Rule

 

The 12-Year Engine Rule: South Africa Finally Moves from Calendar Time to Engine Condition

For years, South African general aviation has been caught in an awkward regulatory debate over the so-called 12-year engine rule.

An engine could have relatively low utilisation, a sound maintenance history and no obvious indication of an impending failure, yet the passage of twelve years could trigger a major maintenance requirement. For private aircraft owners, particularly those operating aircraft for relatively few hours each year, the financial consequences could be severe.

That situation has now changed.

The publication of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment to the Civil Aviation Regulations in Government Gazette No. 55226 on 21 August 2026 provides a regulatory basis for a Condition Monitoring Programme (CMP) under Parts 91 and 43. The change provides an alternative pathway for eligible privately operated, type-certificated piston aircraft to continue operating on condition, subject to the requirements of the programme.

It is best described as a move from calendar-driven maintenance towards condition-based continuing airworthiness.

And that is an important distinction.

An engine does not become safe simply because it is twelve years old.

Nor does it become unsafe simply because it is twelve years old.

The job of the maintenance system is to determine its condition, manage its risks and provide objective evidence that it remains airworthy.

That is ultimately what good aircraft maintenance management should be about.

The African Aviation Paradox

 

FlySafair Showing Confidence

 ‍DUBAI — South Africa's low-cost carrier and Boeing 737 operator Safair (FA) has signed a lease agreement with AerCap for three new Boeing 737-8 and 2 737-800 jets.

Announced on day 2 of the 2025 Dubai Air Show, the deal will see the pair of 737-800s delivered in Q3 of next year, with the 737-8 following in Q1 of 2028.

This is the airline’s first commitment for the 737 MAX, making it the first operator in South Africa after the less than week-long stint with the type in 2021 of now-liquidated Comair.

"We are very pleased to welcome FlySafair as a new customer to AerCap, and to support their fleet modernization plan," said AerCap Chief Commercial Officer, Peter Anderson. "We thank the team at FlySafair for their partnership and wish them every success as they expand their network to meet growing customer demand."

FlySafair Chief Marketing Officer, Kirby Gordon, also stated, "We're thrilled to embark on this next stage of our fleet development with AerCap as we introduce the Boeing 737 MAX to our operations. This partnership represents a meaningful investment in efficiency, sustainability, and passenger experience.”

FlySafair currently operates an all-Boeing 737 fleet consisting of 4 737-400s and 35 737-800s, all second-hand aircraft with all-economy cabins.

March 2025

The regulatory authories have wisely granted FlySafair a grace period of 12 months to attend to the matter of their shareholding and controlling interests. At the same time we expect there to be considerable discussion regarding the definitions of shareholder in the licencing regulations.

This decision is logical and prevents a disruption of air services in the SA market. In the longer term we reiterate our view that local majority shareholding in airlines is not a necessity in the deregulated era. The main national economy benefits of air transport accrue from tourism, jobs, and connectivity. The trading profit of airlines is small in comparison to the broader benefits, and so the national economic interest is best served by increasing air transport activity. Whether this is by locally owned operators or not, is of less importance.

Simultaneous to this saga, FlySafair competitors have continued to publicly aim negative criticism at FlySafair regarding both their overbooking practices, and more recently their safety event reporting. It would seem that this trend to undermine a dominant carrier is increasing, and is to be expected.

FlySafair in hot water

It is difficult to resist the temptation to comment on the current turbulence relating to FlySafair. The turbulence relates to 2 issues, both of which have politico-legal substance.The primary issue relates to the FlySafair "ownership" issue, and the second relates to FlySafair overbooking practices.

As far as the ownership is concerned, both the domestic and international licencing councils have declared FlySafair to be in contravention of South African aviation policy regarding foreign ownership. We currently are waiting for these bodies to announce the sanctions to be proposed. Note that both of these councils consist of government appointees.

There are three areas for discussion of the ownership debate. The first is the overall merit of the requirement for a limit on foreign airline ownership, the second is the legalise surrounding the definitions of ownership, and the third is the impact of the council findings, and who gains and who loses.

For discussion on the overbooking debate we should look at the concept of consumer rights, as opposed to the industry practices, and their impact on airfares.

Ownership Issues

1. The principle of foreign ownership

Although we are in an era of airline deregulation and open skies, many countries do still insist on some portion of local ownership of airlines. This portion varies generally from 25% to 75%. Why is this?

Air transport is a major contributor to any country's economy. The connectivity which the industry provides, leverages major economic activity. Nations are therefore keen to ensure that maximum benefit accrues to local interests in the home country.

Airline profits are wafer-thin, and thus the earnings portion of economic benefit is small compared to the other benefits, such as tourism income, job creation and travel industry earnings. Conversely, for a country with a small economy, the availability of foreign capital can unlock more benefit, than the actual airline earnings portion. This motivates the recent Qatar investment in Airlink.

2. Legalities and sanctions

The licencing councils are constituted as impartial arbitrators, whose role is to enable industry participants whilst ensuring that the air regualtions are complied with.

The fact that it has taken a few years to constitute the air services licencing councils, has led to a long waiting period to address the issues at hand with respect to FlySafair. This should not influence the judgment on this issue, but is most unfortunate.

There is some disagreement on whether owners have to be "natural persons". Most South African airlines have portions of ownership not belonging to natural persons. There is a reasonable argument which proposes that few natural persons have the financial resources to own part, or all, of an airline. This would suggest that the licencing councils, the interpretation, or the air regulations, are off the mark with the rulings under discussion.

There is a suggestion that the licencing councils are being patriotic and chauvinist, rather than pragmatic and understanding of the industry contributions. It is also reported that the councils are imposing conditions on their findings which are not specified in the regulations.

The sanctions available to the licencing councils include fines and suspension of a licence. It seems hardly practical to summarily suspend the FlySafair operating licences. This would have dramatic impact on the travelling public, and the industry in general. A fine seems unlikely, since if we conclude that FlySafair is breach, then it would be argued that is the failure of the licencing councils that FlySafair have been allowed to operate for such a long period.

 

 Winners and losers

Should FlySafair be forced to terminate services, the winners would be the competitor airlines, indeed they are the main instigators. This would include the government owned SAA. The losers, if FlySafair are forced to suspend operations, will be the entire travel industry, including customers, as well as current employees. In the longer term, we would expect airfares to move upwards, thanks to reduced capacity supply, and the disappearance of a benchmark low-cost operator.

 

Overbooking Issues

4. Industry practice

Globally, airlines do overbook flights since on every flight there are likely to be no-shows. The International Air Transport Association fully supports the practice. Each individual airline will adopt a detail policy based on its market and refund policies. In South Africa, some airlines have commented that they do not overbook, but prefer to refuse refunds to no-show passengers.

5. Consumer interest

It is tough to judge which is the worst of 2 evils: overbooking or no refund for the consumer. No-show passengers can have very valid reasons for failing to arrive for a flight. In both cases we believe that the crux of the matter is the manner in which the airline manages and recovers the situation. For example, we would hope that overbooking level is reduced where there are no alternative flights to a destination on the day of the occurrence.

There is no specific provision for airline overbooking in South African consumer legislation. Globally there are specific compensation regulations.