Ethiopian Expansion

Does Ethiopian's expansion develop African aviation capacity, or does it simply transfer African markets into an Ethiopian-controlled network?

Ethiopian has demonstrated something that many African Operators have struggled to achieve: scale, connectivity and financial resilience.

Its expansion can bring:

• better international connectivity into smaller African markets;
• access to Ethiopian's fleet, systems and technical expertise;
• training and operational know-how;
• stronger maintenance and engineering capability;
• access to global distribution;
• potentially lower costs through economies of scale;
• an opportunity for smaller national Operators to survive rather than disappear.

For a country with a small aviation market, partnering with a strong African Operator may be considerably better than having no viable international network at all.

But there is a serious downside

There is a point where African aviation integration becomes Ethiopian aviation expansion.

If Ethiopian takes control of an increasing number of African markets, several things can happen:

1. Local capability may weaken.

A national Operator that becomes dependent on Ethiopian management, aircraft, systems and expertise may never develop its own commercial and operational capability.

2. Profits can leave the local market.

The aircraft may be registered locally and the Operator may employ local people, but the strategic and economic value can increasingly accrue to the parent or controlling partner.

3. Competition can disappear.

This is particularly important. African aviation already suffers from thin markets and limited competition. If one highly successful Operator becomes dominant across multiple countries, the continent may move from fragmented national monopolies to one regional dominant Operator.

That isn't necessarily more competitive.

4. Governments can become dependent.

Once a government relies on Ethiopian for international connectivity, replacing that capability becomes difficult. That gives the stronger party considerable negotiating power.

The ideal outcome is for Ethiopian's investment to build African aviation capability, rather than permanently substitute for it.

That means asking:

Who owns it?
Who controls it?
Who operates it?
Who provides the aircraft?
Who develops the people?
Who earns the profit?
And, critically, what capability remains when the partnership ends?

And there is an even bigger issue behind it: African governments may be trading national aviation sovereignty for connectivity because their domestic markets cannot economically support independent national Operators. That is where the economics gets interesting.

Airlink Update

Airlink is quietly becoming a bigger airline

From 31 August, Airlink will place its 4Z code on Qatar Airways flights between South Africa and Doha, making Doha its first long-haul destination. The arrangement initially covers Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, with further Qatar Airways destinations expected to follow. (Fly Air Link)

I think this is more significant than it looks.

Airlink has built its business around being a regional airline, feeding markets that the large international carriers cannot efficiently serve themselves.

Now it is effectively extending that network into the long-haul market without having to operate long-haul aircraft.

That is smart.

The Qatar relationship already includes Qatar's 25% investment in Airlink and the existing codeshare on Airlink's domestic and regional network. (Fly Air Link)

This is therefore not simply another codeshare, it is a logical development of the partnership.

Airlink can offer its customers access to Doha and Qatar's global network, while Qatar gets deeper access to Airlink's South African and regional network.

That is how a smaller airline can compete with much larger carriers: not by trying to become one, but by becoming more useful to them.

There is another interesting development. Airlink will also launch three weekly Lanseria–Harare flights from 15 November, its first scheduled service from Lanseria. (timeout.com)

Taken together, these moves suggest that Airlink is continuing to build its position as the regional network specialist, rather than simply expanding for the sake of expansion.

And that, in my view, is exactly the right strategy.

 

FlySafair, Harith and CemAir: What Is the Real Issue?

The proposed Harith acquisition of FlySafair has generated the predictable debate about competition, market dominance and ownership.

I think we are looking at the wrong question.

The issue isn't whether Harith should own FlySafair.

The issue is whether South Africa can allow an airline to grow while ensuring that the infrastructure around it remains genuinely competitive.

That is a much more important question.

FlySafair has become successful because it has done something relatively simple very well: operate a low-cost airline efficiently. It has built scale, maintained a strong operational reputation and developed a proposition that works in the South African market.

We should not penalise an airline for achieving that.

In fact, South Africa needs more successful airlines.

The problem arises because Harith is not simply an investor in an airline. It also has an interest in Lanseria Airport. That creates a potential conflict.

An airline competes with other airlines.

An airport provides infrastructure to those airlines.

If the same investment interests are present on both sides, competitors are entitled to ask whether access to the airport will remain neutral.

CemAir has raised precisely that concern.

The better answer is to make the rules around the infrastructure very clear.

Competitors using Lanseria should receive equal treatment.

Airport charges should be transparent.

Access should be non-discriminatory.

Commercially sensitive information must be protected.

And there must be proper oversight when those rules are breached.

If those conditions can be enforced, I don't see why South Africa should prevent investment simply because the investor already has interests elsewhere in the aviation sector.

The bigger issue is scale

There is another point that tends to get lost in these arguments.

South Africa does not have a huge domestic airline market.

We cannot simply assume that more airlines automatically means more competition.

Airlines need scale.

They need aircraft utilisation, network density, purchasing power and efficient operations.

A market containing several financially weak airlines is not necessarily more competitive than one containing fewer financially strong airlines.

We have seen enough airline failures in South Africa to understand this.

The objective should therefore not be to prevent FlySafair from becoming successful.

Nor should it be to allow FlySafair to dominate without constraint.

The objective should be sustainable competition.

That means allowing efficient airlines to grow while ensuring that competitors have a genuine opportunity to compete.

What about CemAir?

CemAir shouldn't simply be dismissed because it is a competitor.

Its concerns deserve to be tested. But there is also a strategic lesson for CemAir. It doesn't need to become another FlySafair.

CemAir's opportunity is to exploit the areas where its own operating model provides an advantage — smaller markets, different aircraft economics and regional connectivity.

And what does Harith bring?

This could ultimately be the most positive aspect of the transaction.

South African aviation needs capital.

It needs infrastructure investment.

It needs airlines that can think beyond the constraints of the domestic market.

If Harith can provide FlySafair with the capital and infrastructure platform to expand into carefully selected African markets, the opportunity could be considerably larger than simply increasing domestic capacity.

My view

I would allow the transaction, subject to strong and enforceable competition safeguards.

The issue is not whether Harith owns FlySafair.

The issue is whether ownership of an airline and interests in aviation infrastructure can coexist without disadvantaging competitors. Historically and all over Africa this is, and has been the case. Consider SAA and ACSA for example.

That is what the regulator should focus on.

South Africa needs investment.

It needs successful airlines. (If the deal stalls then FlySafair will need to seek other ownership due to the outstanding regulatory issues.)

It needs competition.

And it needs infrastructure.

We shouldn't sacrifice one to achieve another.

The objective isn't to protect airlines from competition.

It is to make sure that competition remains possible.

12 Year Engine Rule

 

The 12-Year Engine Rule: South Africa Finally Moves from Calendar Time to Engine Condition

For years, South African general aviation has been caught in an awkward regulatory debate over the so-called 12-year engine rule.

An engine could have relatively low utilisation, a sound maintenance history and no obvious indication of an impending failure, yet the passage of twelve years could trigger a major maintenance requirement. For private aircraft owners, particularly those operating aircraft for relatively few hours each year, the financial consequences could be severe.

That situation has now changed.

The publication of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment to the Civil Aviation Regulations in Government Gazette No. 55226 on 21 August 2026 provides a regulatory basis for a Condition Monitoring Programme (CMP) under Parts 91 and 43. The change provides an alternative pathway for eligible privately operated, type-certificated piston aircraft to continue operating on condition, subject to the requirements of the programme.

It is best described as a move from calendar-driven maintenance towards condition-based continuing airworthiness.

And that is an important distinction.

An engine does not become safe simply because it is twelve years old.

Nor does it become unsafe simply because it is twelve years old.

The job of the maintenance system is to determine its condition, manage its risks and provide objective evidence that it remains airworthy.

That is ultimately what good aircraft maintenance management should be about.

The African Aviation Paradox

 

FlySafair Showing Confidence

 ‍DUBAI — South Africa's low-cost carrier and Boeing 737 operator Safair (FA) has signed a lease agreement with AerCap for three new Boeing 737-8 and 2 737-800 jets.

Announced on day 2 of the 2025 Dubai Air Show, the deal will see the pair of 737-800s delivered in Q3 of next year, with the 737-8 following in Q1 of 2028.

This is the airline’s first commitment for the 737 MAX, making it the first operator in South Africa after the less than week-long stint with the type in 2021 of now-liquidated Comair.

"We are very pleased to welcome FlySafair as a new customer to AerCap, and to support their fleet modernization plan," said AerCap Chief Commercial Officer, Peter Anderson. "We thank the team at FlySafair for their partnership and wish them every success as they expand their network to meet growing customer demand."

FlySafair Chief Marketing Officer, Kirby Gordon, also stated, "We're thrilled to embark on this next stage of our fleet development with AerCap as we introduce the Boeing 737 MAX to our operations. This partnership represents a meaningful investment in efficiency, sustainability, and passenger experience.”

FlySafair currently operates an all-Boeing 737 fleet consisting of 4 737-400s and 35 737-800s, all second-hand aircraft with all-economy cabins.

March 2025

The regulatory authories have wisely granted FlySafair a grace period of 12 months to attend to the matter of their shareholding and controlling interests. At the same time we expect there to be considerable discussion regarding the definitions of shareholder in the licencing regulations.

This decision is logical and prevents a disruption of air services in the SA market. In the longer term we reiterate our view that local majority shareholding in airlines is not a necessity in the deregulated era. The main national economy benefits of air transport accrue from tourism, jobs, and connectivity. The trading profit of airlines is small in comparison to the broader benefits, and so the national economic interest is best served by increasing air transport activity. Whether this is by locally owned operators or not, is of less importance.

Simultaneous to this saga, FlySafair competitors have continued to publicly aim negative criticism at FlySafair regarding both their overbooking practices, and more recently their safety event reporting. It would seem that this trend to undermine a dominant carrier is increasing, and is to be expected.