The Boeing 747: An Aircraft That Changed Aviation

Some aircraft are remembered for their technical achievements. Others change an entire industry. The Boeing 747 did both.

When the jumbo jet entered commercial service with Pan American World Airways on 22 January 1970, it marked the beginning of a new era in commercial aviation. It changed the way airlines operated, airports developed and people travelled around the world.

My own connection to the aircraft is more personal. On 6 November 1971, I witnessed the arrival of South African Airways' first Boeing 747 at Jan Smuts International Airport in Johannesburg.

The aircraft, ZS-SAN, named Lebombo, marked a significant milestone for SAA and South African aviation. The arrival of the jumbo jet represented a new era in long-haul operations, with substantially greater passenger capacity and the potential to reduce the cost per seat on busy international routes.

Looking back, it is worth considering just how much this one aircraft changed.

Changing the economics of air travel

Before the 747, long-haul jet travel was largely associated with a relatively expensive form of international transport. The jumbo jet changed the economics by allowing airlines to carry far more passengers on a single flight.

With a typical early configuration accommodating around 400 passengers, the 747 could spread many of the costs of operating a flight across a much larger number of seats. Where demand was sufficient, this reduced the cost per available seat and gave airlines the opportunity to offer more competitive fares.

The aircraft did not make international travel affordable on its own. Competition, economic growth, airline deregulation and subsequent technological advances all played their part. But the 747 accelerated the move towards mass international air travel.

A catalyst for engine development

The 747 also accelerated the development and commercial application of the large high-bypass turbofan engine.

The aircraft needed substantially more thrust than earlier jetliners, but simply producing more power was not enough. Fuel consumption, operating costs and noise were critical considerations.

The Pratt & Whitney JT9D was developed for the original 747, pushing the limits of engine design, materials and reliability. Competing engines followed, including General Electric's CF6 and Rolls-Royce's RB211.

The large turbofan subsequently became the standard powerplant for wide-body commercial aircraft. Later generations of engines would deliver further improvements in fuel efficiency, reliability and maintenance performance.

The relationship between the aircraft and its engines was mutually reinforcing: the 747 demanded more capable engines, while advances in engine technology made large-scale long-haul operations increasingly practical.

The evolution of the flight deck

The 747 also belongs to an important period in the evolution of the commercial flight deck.

Early 747s still required three flight deck crew members: the captain, first officer and flight engineer. The flight engineer monitored and managed many of the aircraft's technical systems, including fuel, electrical power and hydraulics.

As avionics, automation and systems monitoring improved, aircraft manufacturers increasingly designed commercial aircraft around two-pilot operations. The Boeing 757 and 767 were important examples of this transition.

The 747 did not itself eliminate the flight engineer. Rather, it formed part of a period in which aircraft were becoming larger and more complex, while advances in technology were progressively reducing the number of crew members needed to operate them.

It was a substantial change in the way airlines approached flight operations.

Helping to shape the international hub

The jumbo jet also reinforced the development of major international hub airports and hub-and-spoke airline networks.

An aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers needed substantial demand to operate economically. Airlines could improve their prospects by bringing passengers from several origins through a central airport and consolidating them onto high-capacity long-haul flights.

This strengthened the importance of airports such as London Heathrow, New York JFK and Tokyo Narita as international gateways.

The model offered airlines significant commercial advantages. Connecting traffic could support routes that might not have attracted sufficient demand from passengers travelling only between the two cities served by a flight.

The 747 did not invent the hub-and-spoke system, but its capacity reinforced the economics of concentrating passengers at major airports.

It also encouraged investment in larger terminals, aircraft stands, baggage systems and ground-handling facilities.

More than a passenger aircraft

The 747's influence extended into air freight.

Its large payload capacity made it particularly valuable for cargo operations, while the freighter version's hinged nose allowed long or bulky items to be loaded through the front of the aircraft.

Dedicated 747 freighters became important to international logistics, carrying everything from industrial equipment to time-sensitive commercial goods.

The aircraft therefore contributed to the development of both passenger aviation and the global movement of freight.

Why the jumbo jet eventually lost ground

The 747's commercial success depended on its ability to carry large numbers of passengers economically. But that advantage came with a condition: airlines needed sufficient demand to fill the aircraft.

As engine technology improved, twin-engine aircraft such as the Boeing 777 and Airbus A330 and A350 became capable of operating many long-haul routes with lower operating costs and greater flexibility.

Airlines could offer more frequent services, serve smaller markets and operate direct routes that might not justify a 747.

This illustrates an important principle in airline commercial management. The aircraft with the greatest capacity is not necessarily the most profitable. The right aircraft is the one that best matches demand, frequency, route characteristics and operating costs.

The 747 helped establish the economics of the very large long-haul aircraft. Later generations of aircraft demonstrated the commercial value of flexibility.

A personal perspective on an aviation landmark

Witnessing the arrival of SAA's first Boeing 747 at Johannesburg on 6 November 1971 remains a personal connection to an important moment in South African aviation history.

The aircraft subsequently became part of the fabric of international aviation. It changed the scale of passenger transport, accelerated engine development, contributed to the evolution of the flight deck, reinforced international hub networks and helped expand the role of air freight.

Its legacy is not simply that it was a very large aircraft. It changed how airlines thought about capacity, costs, networks and the business of carrying passengers around the world.

The 747 was a product of its time, but its influence extended well beyond it. Even as newer and more efficient aircraft have taken over many of its passenger routes, the principles it helped establish continue to shape the airline industry.

Air Zimbabwe: The Long Road Back

28 September 2026
There was a time when Air Zimbabwe was one of the better-known airlines in southern Africa.
It had a real international network, including flights to London, and it was an important part of Zimbabwe's air transport system.
Then things went badly wrong.
Aircraft disappeared from service, debts accumulated, the network shrank and the airline became a shadow of what it had once been.
Now Air Zimbabwe is flying to London again.
That sounds like a turnaround story.
But I am not sure we should get carried away just yet.
The airline restarted the Harare–London Gatwick service in July, operating three flights a week with an Airbus A330-300 supplied by Plus Ultra under an ACMI arrangement.
The aircraft has 302 seats.
That is a lot of seats for an airline that has been operating on a relatively small scale.
And that immediately raises the question that matters most:
Can Air Zimbabwe make money out of them?
That is rather more important than whether the aircraft is flying.

London makes sense

There is a good reason for Air Zimbabwe to want London back.
There is a large Zimbabwean community in the UK. There is also tourism, business traffic, government travel, students and the usual visiting-friends-and-relatives market that supports many long-haul routes.
A direct flight from Harare to London is also a much better product than asking passengers to connect somewhere else.
Zimbabwe also wants the tourism business that comes with international visitors, and Victoria Falls is a major attraction.
So there is a genuine market.
But having a market and making money from it are two different things.
That distinction is often lost when airlines announce new routes.
The aircraft may be full.
The airport may be happy.
The tourism authorities may be happy.
The politicians may be happy.
And the airline can still lose money.

The A330 is interesting

The choice of an ACMI aircraft is probably one of the more sensible parts of the operation.
Air Zimbabwe does not have to buy an aircraft.
It does not have to finance the aircraft.
It does not have to recruit and train a new long-haul crew establishment.
It does not have to build an entirely new maintenance operation around the aircraft.
Plus Ultra provides the aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance.
Air Zimbabwe sells the seats.
That gives the airline a way of getting back into the London market without taking on the full cost and risk of owning and operating a widebody aircraft itself.
But ACMI is not cheap.
Air Zimbabwe still has to sell enough seats, at a high enough average fare, to make the numbers work.
And 302 seats three times a week is a substantial amount of capacity.
This is where I would be looking very closely at the numbers.
Not just the load factor.
The yield.

Then there is the rest of the airline

This is where the Air Zimbabwe story gets interesting.
While the London operation was being relaunched, the airline was also dealing with problems elsewhere.
Its Boeing 767 was reportedly impounded at OR Tambo over unpaid airport charges.
Whatever the precise circumstances, it is not a good look for an airline trying to rebuild itself.
This is the problem with airlines.
You cannot really fix one part of the business in isolation.
You can have a very good London route and still have a very weak airline.
The money generated by one route has to support an organisation that has aircraft, engineers, crews, airports, suppliers, offices, systems and a whole range of other costs.
And those bills arrive every month.

Air Zimbabwe's fleet is another problem

The airline has never really escaped its fleet problems.
There have been aircraft sitting idle for long periods, aircraft requiring maintenance and aircraft that have simply become uneconomic to operate.
There have also been questions about the future of the Boeing 777s acquired from Malaysia Airlines.
This raises a point that applies to airlines everywhere.
An aircraft sitting on the ground is not necessarily an asset.

A small fleet that flies regularly and makes money is a much better business than a large fleet sitting around waiting for money to be found to put it back into service.

So what should Air Zimbabwe do?

I would resist the temptation to rebuild the airline simply by adding routes and aircraft.
The first job should be to work out what the airline is actually good at.
London is an obvious candidate.
Victoria Falls is another.
There may be a role for a carefully selected regional network.
There may also be opportunities in cargo.
But every route should be asked the same question:
Does this route make money?

The national airline problem

This is where Air Zimbabwe faces a problem that is not unique to Zimbabwe.
National airlines are rarely judged purely as businesses.
They are expected to provide national connectivity.
They are expected to support tourism.
They are expected to create jobs.
They are expected to fly routes that private airlines might not consider attractive.
And, sometimes, they are expected to be symbols of national pride.
All of those things have value.
But somebody still has to pay for them.
The airline cannot be expected to operate commercially while simultaneously being used as a tool for objectives that have nothing to do with commercial performance.
If the government wants a particular route operated for economic or social reasons, there is an argument for the government to recognise the cost of that decision.
Otherwise the airline ends up being blamed for losses that it was effectively instructed to incur.

Air Zimbabwe has a chance

There is a genuine opportunity here.
Zimbabwe has a tourism industry.
It has a diaspora.
It has a large country with limited surface transport options.
It has Victoria Falls.
It has regional traffic.
And it has a market for an airline that can provide reliable service at a reasonable price.
But the airline does not need to become the Air Zimbabwe of 2005 again.
It does not need a huge fleet.
It does not need to fly everywhere.
It does not need to compete with every airline in the region.
It needs to find the part of the market where it can make money and concentrate on that.
The London flight is a start.
The real test is what happens after the publicity has gone away and the monthly bills start arriving.
That is when we will find out whether Air Zimbabwe is really back.

Contrasting business models

 

Ethiopian Expansion

Does Ethiopian's expansion develop African aviation capacity, or does it simply transfer African markets into an Ethiopian-controlled network?

Ethiopian has demonstrated something that many African Operators have struggled to achieve: scale, connectivity and financial resilience.

Its expansion can bring:

• better international connectivity into smaller African markets;
• access to Ethiopian's fleet, systems and technical expertise;
• training and operational know-how;
• stronger maintenance and engineering capability;
• access to global distribution;
• potentially lower costs through economies of scale;
• an opportunity for smaller national Operators to survive rather than disappear.

For a country with a small aviation market, partnering with a strong African Operator may be considerably better than having no viable international network at all.

But there is a serious downside

There is a point where African aviation integration becomes Ethiopian aviation expansion.

If Ethiopian takes control of an increasing number of African markets, several things can happen:

1. Local capability may weaken.

A national Operator that becomes dependent on Ethiopian management, aircraft, systems and expertise may never develop its own commercial and operational capability.

2. Profits can leave the local market.

The aircraft may be registered locally and the Operator may employ local people, but the strategic and economic value can increasingly accrue to the parent or controlling partner.

3. Competition can disappear.

This is particularly important. African aviation already suffers from thin markets and limited competition. If one highly successful Operator becomes dominant across multiple countries, the continent may move from fragmented national monopolies to one regional dominant Operator.

That isn't necessarily more competitive.

4. Governments can become dependent.

Once a government relies on Ethiopian for international connectivity, replacing that capability becomes difficult. That gives the stronger party considerable negotiating power.

The ideal outcome is for Ethiopian's investment to build African aviation capability, rather than permanently substitute for it.

That means asking:

Who owns it?
Who controls it?
Who operates it?
Who provides the aircraft?
Who develops the people?
Who earns the profit?
And, critically, what capability remains when the partnership ends?

And there is an even bigger issue behind it: African governments may be trading national aviation sovereignty for connectivity because their domestic markets cannot economically support independent national Operators. That is where the economics gets interesting.

Airlink Update

Airlink is quietly becoming a bigger airline

From 31 August, Airlink will place its 4Z code on Qatar Airways flights between South Africa and Doha, making Doha its first long-haul destination. The arrangement initially covers Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, with further Qatar Airways destinations expected to follow. (Fly Air Link)

I think this is more significant than it looks.

Airlink has built its business around being a regional airline, feeding markets that the large international carriers cannot efficiently serve themselves.

Now it is effectively extending that network into the long-haul market without having to operate long-haul aircraft.

That is smart.

The Qatar relationship already includes Qatar's 25% investment in Airlink and the existing codeshare on Airlink's domestic and regional network. (Fly Air Link)

This is therefore not simply another codeshare, it is a logical development of the partnership.

Airlink can offer its customers access to Doha and Qatar's global network, while Qatar gets deeper access to Airlink's South African and regional network.

That is how a smaller airline can compete with much larger carriers: not by trying to become one, but by becoming more useful to them.

There is another interesting development. Airlink will also launch three weekly Lanseria–Harare flights from 15 November, its first scheduled service from Lanseria. (timeout.com)

Taken together, these moves suggest that Airlink is continuing to build its position as the regional network specialist, rather than simply expanding for the sake of expansion.

And that, in my view, is exactly the right strategy.

 

FlySafair, Harith and CemAir: What Is the Real Issue?

The proposed Harith acquisition of FlySafair has generated the predictable debate about competition, market dominance and ownership.

I think we are looking at the wrong question.

The issue isn't whether Harith should own FlySafair.

The issue is whether South Africa can allow an airline to grow while ensuring that the infrastructure around it remains genuinely competitive.

That is a much more important question.

FlySafair has become successful because it has done something relatively simple very well: operate a low-cost airline efficiently. It has built scale, maintained a strong operational reputation and developed a proposition that works in the South African market.

We should not penalise an airline for achieving that.

In fact, South Africa needs more successful airlines.

The problem arises because Harith is not simply an investor in an airline. It also has an interest in Lanseria Airport. That creates a potential conflict.

An airline competes with other airlines.

An airport provides infrastructure to those airlines.

If the same investment interests are present on both sides, competitors are entitled to ask whether access to the airport will remain neutral.

CemAir has raised precisely that concern.

The better answer is to make the rules around the infrastructure very clear.

Competitors using Lanseria should receive equal treatment.

Airport charges should be transparent.

Access should be non-discriminatory.

Commercially sensitive information must be protected.

And there must be proper oversight when those rules are breached.

If those conditions can be enforced, I don't see why South Africa should prevent investment simply because the investor already has interests elsewhere in the aviation sector.

The bigger issue is scale

There is another point that tends to get lost in these arguments.

South Africa does not have a huge domestic airline market.

We cannot simply assume that more airlines automatically means more competition.

Airlines need scale.

They need aircraft utilisation, network density, purchasing power and efficient operations.

A market containing several financially weak airlines is not necessarily more competitive than one containing fewer financially strong airlines.

We have seen enough airline failures in South Africa to understand this.

The objective should therefore not be to prevent FlySafair from becoming successful.

Nor should it be to allow FlySafair to dominate without constraint.

The objective should be sustainable competition.

That means allowing efficient airlines to grow while ensuring that competitors have a genuine opportunity to compete.

What about CemAir?

CemAir shouldn't simply be dismissed because it is a competitor.

Its concerns deserve to be tested. But there is also a strategic lesson for CemAir. It doesn't need to become another FlySafair.

CemAir's opportunity is to exploit the areas where its own operating model provides an advantage — smaller markets, different aircraft economics and regional connectivity.

And what does Harith bring?

This could ultimately be the most positive aspect of the transaction.

South African aviation needs capital.

It needs infrastructure investment.

It needs airlines that can think beyond the constraints of the domestic market.

If Harith can provide FlySafair with the capital and infrastructure platform to expand into carefully selected African markets, the opportunity could be considerably larger than simply increasing domestic capacity.

My view

I would allow the transaction, subject to strong and enforceable competition safeguards.

The issue is not whether Harith owns FlySafair.

The issue is whether ownership of an airline and interests in aviation infrastructure can coexist without disadvantaging competitors. Historically and all over Africa this is, and has been the case. Consider SAA and ACSA for example.

That is what the regulator should focus on.

South Africa needs investment.

It needs successful airlines. (If the deal stalls then FlySafair will need to seek other ownership due to the outstanding regulatory issues.)

It needs competition.

And it needs infrastructure.

We shouldn't sacrifice one to achieve another.

The objective isn't to protect airlines from competition.

It is to make sure that competition remains possible.

12 Year Engine Rule

 

The 12-Year Engine Rule: South Africa Finally Moves from Calendar Time to Engine Condition

For years, South African general aviation has been caught in an awkward regulatory debate over the so-called 12-year engine rule.

An engine could have relatively low utilisation, a sound maintenance history and no obvious indication of an impending failure, yet the passage of twelve years could trigger a major maintenance requirement. For private aircraft owners, particularly those operating aircraft for relatively few hours each year, the financial consequences could be severe.

That situation has now changed.

The publication of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment to the Civil Aviation Regulations in Government Gazette No. 55226 on 21 August 2026 provides a regulatory basis for a Condition Monitoring Programme (CMP) under Parts 91 and 43. The change provides an alternative pathway for eligible privately operated, type-certificated piston aircraft to continue operating on condition, subject to the requirements of the programme.

It is best described as a move from calendar-driven maintenance towards condition-based continuing airworthiness.

And that is an important distinction.

An engine does not become safe simply because it is twelve years old.

Nor does it become unsafe simply because it is twelve years old.

The job of the maintenance system is to determine its condition, manage its risks and provide objective evidence that it remains airworthy.

That is ultimately what good aircraft maintenance management should be about.